In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, an economic crisis that is predicted to be as bad as the great depression, and unrest over racial inequality and police brutality that is giving birth to a global movement for social change, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia (Case No. 17–1618) on June 15, 2020 and announced with finality that an employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII.   The decision was a shock to some and long overdue for others.  Regardless of one’s political or social leanings, it is without question that the decision is an important one that will have far reaching consequences throughout the country.

Summary of Facts and Lower Court Rulings.

The Bostock case is actually a consolidation of three separate cases. In each of these cases, an employer allegedly fired a long-time employee simply for being homosexual or transgender. Clayton County, Georgia, fired Gerald Bostock for conduct “unbecoming” a county employee shortly after he began participating in a gay recreational softball league. Altitude Express fired Donald Zarda days after he mentioned being gay. And R. G. & G. R. Harris Funeral Homes fired Aimee Stephens, who presented as a male when she was hired, after she informed her employer that she planned to “live and work full-time as a woman.” Each employee sued, alleging sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). The Eleventh Circuit held that Title VII does not prohibit employers from firing employees for being gay and so Mr. Bostock’s suit could be dismissed as a matter of law. The Second and Sixth Circuits, however, allowed the claims of Mr. Zarda and Ms. Stephens, respectively, to proceed. The Supreme Court granted review of the cases and its decision puts to rest the split of authority between the Circuits as to whether Title VII protects LGBTQ employees from discrimination in the workplace.

Supreme Court Analysis.

Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion (joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan).  In a direct and no-nonsense fashion, Justice Gorsuch said that few facts were needed to appreciate the legal question the Court faced:

Each of the three cases before us started the same way: An employer fired a long-time employee shortly after the employee revealed that he or she is homosexual or transgender—and allegedly for no reason other than the employee’s homosexuality or transgender status.

The Court said that with this in mind, their “task is clear.”  The Court had to determine the ordinary meaning of Title VII’s command that it is “unlawful . . . for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” To do so, the Court said it had to orient itself and examine the key statutory terms in Title VII when adopted in 1964, and examine the impact of those terms on the cases before them considering the Court’s precedents.

The only statutorily protected characteristic at issue in the cases and which the parties dispute was based on, is “sex.”  The employers claimed that the term “sex” in 1964 referred to “status as either male or female [as] determined by reproductive biology.” The employees countered by submitting that, even in 1964, the term bore a broader scope, capturing more than anatomy and reaching at least some norms concerning gender identity and sexual orientation. However, candidly, the Court said that the parties’ debate over the meaning of “sex” in 1964 is not the real focus of the analysis.  According to the Court, the question isn’t just what “sex” meant, but what Title VII says about it. Most notably, the statute prohibits employers from taking certain actions “because of” sex but it doesn’t matter if other factors besides sex contribute to the action.  Also, when analyzing a discrimination case under Title VII, the focus is not on class or group (men v. women) treatment, but rather individual treatment.

Prior precedent has made clear that Title VII’s message is “simple but momentous”: An individual employee’s sex is “not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or compensation of employees.” (Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228, 239 (1989) (plurality opinion).  The Court said that the statute’s message for the cases before it was equally simple and momentous: “An individual’s homosexuality or transgender status is not relevant to employment decisions. That’s because it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual or transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex.” 

To help illustrate its reasoning, the Court provided a number of hypotheticals.

  • “Consider, for example, an employer with two employees, both of whom are attracted to men. The two individuals are, to the employer’s mind, materially identical in all respects, except that one is a man and the other a woman. If the employer fires the male employee for no reason other than the fact he is attracted to men, the employer discriminates against him for traits or actions it tolerates in his female colleague. Put differently, the employer intentionally singles out an employee to fire based in part on the employee’s sex, and the affected employee’s sex is a but-for cause of his discharge.”
  • “Or take an employer who fires a transgender person who was identified as a male at birth but who now identifies as a female. If the employer retains an otherwise identical employee who was identified as female at birth, the employer intentionally penalizes a person identified as male at birth for traits or actions that it tolerates in an employee identified as female at birth. Again, the individual employee’s sex plays an unmistakable and impermissible role in the discharge decision.”

As the Court pointed out, homosexuality and transgender status are inextricably bound up with sex. Not because homosexuality or transgender status are related to sex in some vague sense or because discrimination on these bases has some disparate impact on one sex or another, but because to discriminate on these grounds requires an employer to intentionally treat individual employees differently because of their sex. Also, it doesn’t matter that when an employer treats one employee worse because of that individual’s sex, other factors may contribute to the decision. For example, the Court said consider this hypothetical:

  • “Consider an employer with a policy of firing any woman he discovers to be a Yankees fan. Carrying out that rule because an employee is a woman and a fan of the Yankees is a firing “because of sex” if the employer would have tolerated the same allegiance in a male employee.”

The Court said the same is true in the cases before it.  “When an employer fires an employee because she is homosexual or transgender, two causal factors may be in play – both the individual’s sex and something else (the sex to which the individual is attracted or with which the individual identifies). But Title VII doesn’t care. If an employer would not have discharged an employee but for that individual’s sex, the statute’s causation standard is met, and liability may attach.”

Finally, an employer musters no better a defense by responding that it is equally happy to fire male and female employees  who are homosexual or transgender. According to the Court, “Title VII liability is not limited to employers who, through the sum of all of their employment actions, treat the class of men differently than the class of women. Instead, the law makes each instance of discriminating against an individual employee because of that individual’s sex an independent violation of Title VII.”

The Bostock decision ends years of conflicting decision between federal Circuit courts as to the coverage of Title VII protections against discrimination for LGBTQ employees.  For those employers who are not located in a state that already provided those protections under state law, now is the time to ensure that policies, practices, and trainings address these protections.

The employment lawyers at Weintraub Tobin have years of experience counseling, training, and defending employers in all areas of employment law, including harassment and discrimination under Title VII and California law.  Please reach out to us if we can assist you in your employment law compliance.

My colleague Brendan Begley blogged last week about the risks employers face due to the threat of COVID-19 in the workplace.  As he noted, employees have the right to expect employers to follow city, county, and state orders and take reasonable precautions to minimize the risk to a known “direct threat” to health and safety.

Now, in the wake of the horrific death of George Floyd 10 days ago, the citizens of our nation have risen up to demand racial equality and an end to systemic injustice.  Our nation’s pent up frustrations have boiled over, and, unfortunately, some of that frustration is being expressed violently.

In the last few days, I’ve been hearing from business owners who were focused on steps to reopen after COVID-19, but are now worried about preventing potential destruction of property, theft, and violence.  While owners work to protect their businesses, they must also not forget to take reasonable steps to protect their employees from harm.

Does Your IIPP Address Violence and Theft?

While CalOSHA recently issued guidelines that said most CA employers would need to update their Injury and Illness Prevention Plan (“IIPP”) to address COVID-19,  employers should also review their IIPP to make sure it complies with California law with respect to violence in the workplace. IIPPs are required to outline various safety protocols and policies – and one of the subjects you must cover is violence in the workplace.   Employers must assess the types of hazards likely to be faced depending on the type of business.  The hazards presented by civil unrest may or may not be something a small business owner ever considered when drafting an IIPP.  (Don’t have one? The DIR has a free Etool – www.dir.ca.gov/dosh/etools/09-031/index.htm to help you create one!)

Remember, employers cannot retaliate against employees who oppose or report perceived safety hazards, unsafe practices, or violations of law in the workplace.

Safety First!

Just before I sat down to write this, I drove to my favorite local restaurant to pick up lunch. Many businesses in my city were closing, or open but in the process of boarding up windows and installing barricades, hoping to prevent damage if tonight’s planned protests turn violent.

If a business does decide to stay open in the face of planned or threatened protests or looting in your area, here is some common-sense advice:

  • Be sure to have an emergency action plan and communicate your plan to employees.
  • Make sure that employees have an escape route, or that they know they are free to go home if they feel unsafe.
  • Do not violate curfews that may be put in place, and do not ask employees to do so.
  • Reinforce the message that their health and safety is the number one priority, and especially for employees who may be in danger when they leave work to go home, consider sending them home early.
  • “Call 911” may not be a sufficient response to an emergency in the face of widespread riots and looting, since the police force will likely already be out in force but may be overwhelmed.
  • Make sure employees know that they are not expected to, and should not, attempt to interfere with looters, or put themselves in harm’s way, or violate curfew. Lives cannot be replaced.

Please, stay safe and take care of each other. Don’t hesitate to call your Weintraub Tobin employment advisor if you need guidance or assistance during these unprecedented times. We are all in this together.

 

As workplaces begin reopening in the coming weeks, attorneys are predicting a rash of lawsuits by employees against their employers related to the COVID-19 pandemic.  It seems clear that workers-compensation preemption may immunize employers from most civil actions alleging that employees became infected with the virus on the job.  However, other types of employee lawsuits may reach fever pitch.

There does not appear to be any vaccination to alleviate many of the anticipated claims.  Still, just as good hygiene practices may help flatten the curve of the actual coronavirus, good employment practices can help reduce the incidence of such lawsuits in your workplace.  Here are four types of employment claims that are likely to spread like a contagion as employees are expected to (or actually do) return to their jobs, along with some inoculations that employers should consider:

Disability Claims

According to at least one media outlet, the head of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s New York office reported this week that charges accusing employers of failing to accommodate workers’ disabilities are outpacing any other allegation tied to COVID-19 in the Empire State.  Employers should anticipate similar developments here in the Golden State.

Indeed, California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) and its federal counterpart, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), both prohibit disability discrimination and require employers to provide reasonable accommodations to disabled employees.  An ounce of prevention – by engaging in the interactive process (from a safe distance) with infected or otherwise disabled employees to identify reasonable accommodations – often is more economical than the pound of cure that would come from prevailing in a failure-to-accommodate lawsuit.

In this regard, employers should remember that each request for an accommodation must be analyzed independently, and that a leave of absence may constitute a reasonable accommodation.  Thus, if employees request a leave of absence, either to get over their own COVID-19 infection or to reduce the risk of being exposed to the coronavirus due to some preexisting disability that puts them at greater risk, serious thought must be given to fashioning a workable accommodation.

Some employers may find respite in the notion that a coronavirus infection might not constitute an actual disability under the ADA or the FEHA, as the illness typically impairs its victims moderately or for only a short duration of time.  But this brand of comfort is often an ineffective placebo and not a recommended treatment to prevent the spread of disability lawsuits.  That is because the effects of a COVID-19 infection may be more long-lasting or create a more severe impairment for some individuals.  Thus, it would be a mistake for an employer to assume that such an infection can never amount to a protected disability.

At the same time, both the FEHA and the ADA prohibit employers from discriminating on the basis of a perceived disability.  Thus, it is foreseeable that some employers might decide to treat certain workers differently than others because they believe certain workers have some other actual or perceived medical condition (e.g., a persistent cough, or diabetes, or an immunodeficiency, or Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease).  Employers may worry that letting such vulnerable employees return to the job or interact with coworkers might make them more susceptible to getting or spreading COVID-19.  While treating such employees differently in this manner may seem (or even might actually be) an act of caring and concern that would rival Florence Nightingale, such actions can lead to costly challenges in court (especially if they are applied in a clumsy fashion).

Disability harassment is another type of claim that employers may anticipate.  One way this type of claim may arise is when coworkers, managers or supervisors develop a notion that a particular employee was (or is) infected with coronavirus and spread (or is spreading) the sickness to the workplace.  If such coworkers, managers or supervisors are allowed to harass, insult or ostracize an employee on that basis, the employer may find itself in need of some urgent care from lawyers.

Tameny Claims

The so-called Tameny claim is named after the California Supreme Court’s decision 40 years ago in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167.  Under the high court’s ruling in that case, a worker may pursue a lawsuit when he or she alleges that the employer terminated his or her employment in violation of some public policy.

It is difficult to tally how many Tameny claims are spreading in California, as the administrative agencies that handle claims of disability discrimination (or other types of discrimination, harassment or retaliation) typically are not responsible for investigating a Tameny claim.  So we may not know for many months how many Tameny claims have been filed in court; nonetheless, there is good reason to think the number will be high.

Keep in mind that California has a public policy that requires employers to “furnish employment and a place of employment that is safe and healthful for the employees therein.”  (Cal. Labor Code, § 6400.)  Also bear in mind that California has a public policy that prohibits employers from “preventing an employee from disclosing information to a government or law enforcement agency,” or to a manager or supervisor, “who has authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance.”  (Cal. Labor Code, § 1102.5.)

With those public policies in mind, there are two general ways to become exposed to a Tameny affliction.  One arises when an employee is fired for refusing to execute some task on the job that actually would be unlawful.  The second arises when the employee is fired for complaining about what he or she reasonably perceives to be unlawful activity in the workplace (even if the activity in question turns out to be legal).

Regarding the first variety, it is easy to foresee the following scenario developing:  An employer directs an employee to return to work and the employee refuses and is fired.  If the employer instructed the employee to return before the government lifted restrictions for that specific workplace, terminating the employee for refusing to return may violate a public policy.  Likewise, if the employer waits until the restrictions lift but then fails to enforce regulations requiring social distancing or sanitary practices or the donning of personal protective equipment (“PPE”), firing an employee for refusing to work under such conditions may also be in violation of public policy.

Turning to the second type of Tameny ailments, it is equally easy to anticipate these scenarios occurring:  An employer directs an employee to return to work either before the restrictions are lifted or after the restrictions are lifted but without implementing or enforcing policies for social distancing, sanitation, or PPE.  The employee complies, returns to the job, and performs his or her work, but not quietly or without protest.  Instead, the employee complains about the workplace conditions, either to a governmental agency or a supervisor, and is subsequently fired.  Terminating an employee for complaining about such workplace conditions may be in violation of public policy.

One aspect of many Tameny claims that make them look less severe than other types of claims is that they often do not result in the employer having to pay the employee’s attorney fees.  However, given the other undesirable symptoms and bad side-effects that such lawsuits can trigger (e.g., lost productivity due to litigation, or the risk of emotional-distress and even punitive damages), that is a bit like telling a sick patient suffering from simultaneous chills and sweats that a fever of 103.8 degrees is not as bad as one that is 104 degrees.

Leave Claims

There are a number of federal and state laws that require various employers to provide a certain amount of protected leave to covered employees; for example, the federal Families First Coronavirus Response Act (“FFCRA”), the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and the California Family Rights Act (“CFRA”).

The FFCRA was passed just this year to provide workers with protected leave if they have been impacted in various ways by the coronavirus and related shelter-in-place orders.  It has already resulted in what some might call an epidemic of lawsuits where employees have claimed that their employer interfered with their protected leave, denied them benefits, or fired them in retaliation for requesting leave.

Meanwhile, the FMLA and the CFRA are not geared specifically for coronavirus-related leaves, like the FFCRA is, but those laws may still protect such leaves of absence.  Making things more complicated, there may be overlap between these leave entitlements and some employers may be subject to all of these laws, while others are subject to some or none of them.

It is very probable that employers will be faced with many more leave requests, either to care for someone who has been infected with COVID-19 or to stay at home with a child whose school or daycare facility remains closed while some restrictions are lifted.  Of course, employees also may request leave to deal with other health conditions that deteriorated while they were unable to get routine medical treatment while sheltered in place.  Each leave request should be given serious consideration.

Discrimination Claims

Whereas some employers may be struggling with too many employees in need of leave, others may be grappling with having to lay off employees due to downturns in business as a result of the shelter-in-place restrictions.  In either scenario, care must be given to how such decisions are made and serious thought must be devoted to the potential results.

Such decisions may trigger claims under the FEHA or its federal counterparts, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.  Those laws bar making employment decisions on the basis of certain protected categories; for instance, age, race, national-origin, gender or religion.

When deciding which employees are going to be given leaves of absence, or laid off, or assigned to certain duties, consistent procedures and rationales must be followed.  Even then, under what is called the disparate-impact type of claim, a neutral policy or practice can lead to discrimination liability if it has a statistically disproportionate impact on a certain class of workers.

Inoculate Against Such Claims

There is no vaccine that will prevent or get rid of all such claims, but the harmful effects of such lawsuits can be ameliorated by following certain precautions.

First, be sensitive to actual or perceived disabilities, do not make medical assumptions, work hard to identify and implement reasonable accommodations for disabled employees, and be vigilant in guarding against harassment of employees on the basis of some perceived or actual medical condition.

Second, take every request for a disability accommodation or leave of absence seriously and analyze each one independently on its own merits.

Third, do not violate or direct your employees to violate governmental shelter-in-place, social-distancing, sanitary or PPE restrictions or regulations.

Fourth, whenever making a termination decision, be sure it is for reasons that have absolutely nothing to do with the employee’s refusal to violate some public policy or the employee’s complaints about reasonably perceived violations of some public policy.

Fifth, make certain that personnel decisions have nothing to with protected classifications (e.g., age, race, gender, religion) and carefully analyze how decisions may impact protected classes of employees.

Just as there presently is no medicine that is sure to eradicate the current pandemic, there is no one-size-fits-all regimen that will completely wipeout such employment claims.  Even these steps cannot completely immunize employers against all these types of lawsuits, yet failing to adopt such protective measures probably will increase the risk of exposure to these afflictions.

Finally, it seems obvious that getting prompt medical attention may stem the more serious effects of a disease; by the same token, obtaining early legal advice may decrease the incidence or cost of these exorbitant types of lawsuits.

On May 20, 2020, the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) announced that it has finally launched free anti-sexual harassment training for non-supervisory employees. The online training, which is available through DFEH’s website – https://www.dfeh.ca.gov/shpt/ – will meet an employer’s obligation to provide training to non-supervisory employees by January 1, 2021.

Section 12950.1 of the California Government Code requires employers with five or more employees to provide at least one-hour of classroom or other effective interactive training and education regarding sexual harassment prevention to all non-supervisory employees in California.

According to the DFEH’s announcement, its new training is interactive and optimized for mobile devices and is accessible for persons with disabilities. The training is currently available in English and will be available in five additional languages in the coming months (Spanish, Simplified Chinese, Tagalog, Vietnamese, and Korean).

The DFEH said that it is planning to launch a similar online training for supervisors in California in the coming months to help employers meet their obligation under Government Code section 12950.1 to provide supervisors with two hours of training by January 1, 2021.

The full DFEH announcement can be found at: https://www.dfeh.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/32/2020/05/SHPT_PR.pdf

The Labor and Employment attorneys at Weintraub Tobin continue to wish you and your family good health during these unsettling times.  If we can assist you in any of your employment law needs, feel free to reach out to one of us.

This is a follow up to our previous blog regarding California’s gradual entry into Stage 2 of the State’s re-opening plan – termed the “Resilience Roadmap.”  As Governor Newsom announced on Tuesday, May 13, 2020, counties are able to, and are, submitting their attestations to the State to speed up the reopening of certain businesses within their counties.  As such, the gradual reopening of businesses in Stage 2 is a fluid and rapidly evolving process driven not only by the State’s decisions on what businesses can and cannot reopen (on a modified basis) at this time, but also on what counties are doing to help move the process along for their businesses.  However, it is important to note, that the State has made very clear that if counties have more restrictive shelter-in-place orders in place, they may continue to enforce them even if the State’s order is modified to reduce certain restrictions.

The evolving re-opening plan around the State is being regularly updated on the State’s website.  Because the updates are happening in real time, it is important for businesses to regularly check the California Department of Public Health’s website to determine the current status of the State and county orders that apply to their business location(s). The website can be found here: https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CID/DCDC/Pages/COVID-19/Local-Variance-Attestations.aspx

The Labor and Employment attorneys at Weintraub Tobin continue to wish you and your family good health during these challenging times. If we can assist you with your employment law needs, please reach out to any one of us.