The Labor and Employment Law Blog : Labor & Employment Lawyer & Attorney : Weintraub Genshlea Chediak Law Firm : Sacramento California : Labor & Employment Law Blog

In Nein v. HostPro, Inc., a Court of Appeal held that the language of the employee’s employment agreement precluded him from recovering commissions following his termination of employment. Plaintiff worked as a sales representative for HostPro for a period of 2 years. He signed an employment agreement that expressly provided that Plaintiff would be eligible for commission pay “so long as [he] remains employed with the Company as a Sales Representative.”

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Labor Code section 206.5 provides that “an employer shall not require the execution of a release of a claim or right on account of wages due, or to become due, or made as an advance on wages to be earned, unless payment of those wages has been made. A release required or executed in violation of the provisions of this section shall be null and void as between the employer and the employee.” The section also provides that requiring such a release could constitute a misdemeanor.

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In VL Systems, Inc. v. Unison, Inc., the Court of Appeal struck down a “no hire” provision contained in a consulting agreement as violating section 16600 of California’s Business and Professions Code. Section 16600 provides “Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind is to that extent void.” This past summer, the California Supreme Court in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen used the same reasoning to strike down a “non-competition” provision in an employment agreement.

Raymond Edwards was hired by Arthur Andersen as a tax manager in January 1997. His employment by Andersen was made contingent upon his signing a non-competition agreement which prohibited him from working for or soliciting certain clients for a limited period of time following the termination of his employment. The agreement also prohibited Edwards from soliciting Andersen’s employees who he worked with for an 18 month period following the termination of his employment.

During the next five years, Edwards worked for Andersen and moved into the firm’s private client services group where he serviced the accounts for large income/net worth individuals and entities. However, the U.S. government indicted Andersen in connection with the collapse of Enron in March 2002. Andersen announced in June 2002 that it would cease its accounting practices in the United States. Andersen then sold a portion of its tax practice, including Edwards’ Group, to HSBC. Before hiring of any of Andersen’s employees, HSBC required them to execute a “Termination of Non-Compete Agreement” (“TONC”) in order to gain employment with HSBC. The TONC contained a release of any claims that the employee may have against Andersen and was required to be signed by every employee before the deal with HSBC/Andersen went through. Edwards signed his HSBC employment offer letter but declined to sign the TONC. As a result, Andersen terminated Edwards’ employment and HSBC withdrew its employment offer.

In April 2003, Edwards sued Andersen and others for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage and anti-competitive business practices under the Cartwright Act. After Edwards settled with all parties except Andersen, the Court dismissed all but one of the claims against Andersen and later entered judgment in Andersen’s favor on the remaining intentional interference claim. The trial court found that the non-competition agreement did not violate section 16600 because it was narrowly tailored and did not deprive Edwards of his right to pursue his profession.

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Businesses, especially consultants, frequently include a no-hire provision in connection with service or consulting agreements. These provisions are usually intended to prevent the client from soliciting or hiring away the consulting company’s employees. No-hire provisions have two primary goals: First, to protect the employees of one business from being recruited away by the companies they provided services to. The second goal is to help retain customers, i.e., if the client business is able to recruit a consulting business’s employees, there would be no further need for the consulting company’s services.
 

On June 25, 2007, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Appellate District struck down a “no- hire” provision in VL Systems, Inc. v. Unisen, Inc. (Case No. G037334). Though the VL Systems Court emphasized that there were limitations on the extent of its holding, companies that rely on “no-hire” provisions, and the attorneys who advise them, should take heed of some of the concerns raised by the VL Systems Court.

In 2004, VLS entered into an agreement with Star Trac (a Unisen dba) to provide computer consulting services with regarding a new computer server. The contract was not large and estimated only 16 hours of work by VLS’ consultants. The contract, however, included a 12-month no-hire provision which stated: “BUYER WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO HIRE SELLER’S PERSONNEL. Any hiring or offer of employment entitles but does not require VL Systems, Inc. to immediately cancel the performance period of this agreement.” The “no-hire” provision also contained a liquidated damages clause.

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A California appellate court was recently faced with the issue of when the statute of limitations runs on a claim for trade secret misappropriation against a third party when the plaintiff’s trade secrets are stolen and sold to that third party. On May 30, 2008, the appellate court issued its opinion in Cypress Semiconductor Corporation v. Superior Court (Silvaco Data Systems) and held that the statute of limitations on a cause of action for trade secret misappropriation begins to run when the plaintiff has reason to suspect that the third party knows or reasonably should know that the information in its possession is a trade secret. The appellate court held that the third party’s actual state of mind did not matter for purposes of the running of the statute of limitations.

Silvaco develops and licenses electronic design automation software. This software allows its customers to design their own software products. Silvaco created a software product known as SmartSpice and maintained that its source code was a trade secret.

In late 1998, a former employee working for a competitor incorporated the SmartSpice trade secrets into a product called DynaSpice. Silvaco began to suspect in 2000 that its trade secrets had been misappropriated and sued both the former employee and the competitor. However, Silvaco did not take any action to notify any of its competitor’s customers who had licensed DynaSpice for their own use.

In August 2003, Silvaco and the competitor entered into a settlement agreement and stipulated judgment. The competitor agreed to stop licensing DynaSpice and to inform its customers that the DynaSpice software contained Silvaco’s trade secrets and that they should terminate their use of DynaSpice. Cypress Semiconductor, one of the competitor’s customers, learned of the judgment in late August 2003.
 

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Nineteen former employees who signed releases after being terminated in a RIF and who did not file EEOC charges may proceed in joining the class bringing ADA claims against their former employer. The plaintiffs alleged the waivers were invalid under the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (“OWBPA”) because they misrepresented the number of employees selected for termination, failed to accurately list those selected for termination, were not written in a manner reasonably calculated to be understood by the average employee, and did not disclose the criterion used to select employees for termination. The plaintiffs also claimed they were not given the requisite 45 days to decide whether to sign. If the plaintiffs’ allegations were true, the waivers would be invalid; therefore the court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss based on valid waivers. The fact that nineteen employees did not file claims with the EEOC also was not a bar. Those employees may properly “piggyback” on the timely filed charges of two other plaintiffs who alleged classwide discrimination. Such charges gave sufficient notice to the employer of the classwide discrimination claims alleged in the complaint.

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In Bernard v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, plaintiff sued his employer for constructive discharge and "breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing," claiming it misrepresented its sales program requirements. Plaintiff claimed the company had a termination for cause only policy. However, he had signed the following at will agreement: "You or State Farm have the right to terminate this Agreement by written notice delivered to the other or mailed to the other's last known address." The termination provision also provided for termination upon specified notice. The court found that this provision negated any arguments that the company needed good cause for termination.

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Plaintiff Varisco was certified by the California Division of the State Architect (“DSA”) as a Class-1 Inspector. On January 30, 2004, Gateway Science entered into a written agreement with Varisco which stated that Gateway Science would pay Varisco for providing DSA Inspection Services to the Los Angeles Unified School District. In November of 2004, Gateway Science sent Varisco a letter terminating the relationship because Varisco refused to sign a new contract with Gateway Science, and refused to provide Gateway Science with various documents that it requested. Varisco sued Gateway Science for damages under various theories, arguing that he had actually been an employee instead of an independent contractor.

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Introduced in September by Barack Obama, SB 2044 places stricter requirements on who can be classified as an independent contractor rather than an employee. If independent contractors are moved into the category of employees, employers will be required to pay higher taxes on those individuals. Additionally, such legislation would increase potential liability concerns for employers. The legislation is still pending.

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