"Same Actor" Defense

by Chuck Post

I was recently asked something of a “desert island” question. Instead of being asked what 10 records or 10 movies I would take to a desert island, I was asked, “If an employer could only do one thing to reduce its exposure to employment discrimination liability, what should it do?” Shooting from the hip, I said, “Whenever you can, have the same actor who hires an employee be the person who disciplines or terminates them.” This practice or strategy doesn’t immunize an employer against discrimination claims, but: “Where the same actor is responsible for both the hiring and firing of a discrimination plaintiff, and both actions occur within a short period of time, a strong inference arises that there was no discriminatory motive.” The rationale underlying this doctrine is that from the standpoint of the alleged discriminator, it “hardly makes sense to hire workers from a group one dislikes (thereby incurring the psychological cost of associating with them), only to fire them once they are on the job.” (Horn v. Cushman & Wakefield Western, Inc.) This concept has also been applied where the alleged discriminator promoted the plaintiff before taking later adverse action against him or her.

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Is Your Company Ready for the November 21, 2009 Deadline under GINA?

by Lizbeth V. West

The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) takes effect November 21, 2009. Among other things, GINA requires that employers post a notice informing employees that the employer does not discriminate on the basis of genetic information.

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AN EMPLOYEE'S "ME TOO" EVIDENCE CAN PROVE DISCRIMINATION

By Lizbeth V. West

In Johnson v. United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic Children’s Foundation of Los Angeles and Ventura Counties, a California Court of Appeal has held that an employee can prove a case of discrimination by putting on evidence from other employees that claim that they too were subject to discrimination by the employer (“me too” evidence).

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A DISABILITY ACCESS CLAIM UNDER THE UNRUH ACT DOES NOT REQUIRE A SHOWING OF INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION

The California Supreme Court has finally settled the troubling issue of whether intentional discrimination must be shown to prove a disability access claim under the California Unruh Act. In Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., the Court decided the issue after it was certified to the California Supreme Court from the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit because of the conflicting decisions in federal and state courts.

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AN EMPLOYER'S DILEMMA: DISPARATE TREATMENT VERSUS DISPARATE IMPACT

The United States Supreme Court has issued its ruling in the Ricci, et. al. v. Destefano, et. al. case (referred to by the press as the “reverse” discrimination case that U.S. Supreme Court nominee, Sonia Sotomayor, decided with other Court of Appeal justices). Essentially the case stands for the rule that an employer may not manipulate (adjust for race conscious reasons) the results of a legitimate, facially neutral, and job-related promotional examination to obtain a more diverse workforce absent a showing that there is a strong basis for the employer to believe that if it does not manipulate the results it will be exposed to disparate impact liability (unintentional discrimination liability based on the negative effect an otherwise neutral policy or practice may have on a protected class).

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AGE MUST BE THE "BUT FOR" CAUSE FOR ALLEGED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

In the recent case of Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., the United States Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must prove that his/her age was the “but for” cause of the adverse employment action they claim was discriminatory (e.g. demotion). Plaintiff was 54 years old when his employer reassigned him from his position as a claims administration director to a claims project coordinator. Many of his responsibilities in the director position were transferred to one of his subordinates who was in her early 40’s. Although Plaintiff’s compensation was not reduced, he believed that his transfer to the coordinator position was a demotion and filed an age discrimination claim under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).

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Congress and President Obama Trump the Supreme Court: Ledbetter Fair Pay Act Signed Into Law

In his first significant act as President in the labor and employment arena, President Obama effectively overturned the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. by signing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act ("Ledbetter Act") into law this Thursday. The main thrust of the Ledbetter Act is that it “resets” the statute of limitations for wage claims based on discrimination each time an employee receives a paycheck affected by the alleged discriminatory practice.


Background
 

Lilly Ledbetter worked for her employer, Goodyear, for 19 years. She accused Goodyear of gender discrimination under Title VII on the grounds that, throughout her almost 20 career, she was consistently paid less than male employees who were similarly situated. The Supreme Court found that Ledbetter’s Title VII action was time-barred; holding that the statute of limitations starts running under Title VII when the employer makes the original discriminatory pay decision. The Court rejected Ledbetter’s argument that her claim was “refreshed” each time she received a paycheck affected by Goodyear’s discrimination.

The Ledbetter Act

The Ledbetter Act “resets” the statute of limitations for wage claims based on discrimination (in any form recognized by federal law) each time an employee receives a paycheck affected by the alleged discriminatory practice. Moreover, the Act defines “unlawful employment practices” broadly to encompass any practice that affects an employee’s compensation.

Bottom Line

Given the speed of which this new administration was able to push through this fairly substantial legislation, employers should anticipate continued robust efforts from Washington to further bolster employee protections in the coming months.

What Steps Should Employers Take?

While it will likely take some time for the courts to interpret the new law and provide guidance for employers to take steps to avoid litigation, there are a few initial steps employers should consider taking now:
 

  • Examine compensation policies to ensure they do not discriminate on the basis of a protected class or protected activity.
  • Work with employment counsel to structure and conduct a self-audit of compensation practices and discuss best practices for retention and destruction of compensation records.
  • Train supervisors and managers regarding proper and improper considerations when making discretionary compensation decisions.

 

The U.S. Supreme Court Holds that Participating in a Discrimination Investigation may Constitute "Opposition" to Illegal Conduct for Title VII Retaliation Purposes: Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee

In 2002, Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee (Metro), began looking into rumors of sexual harassment by one of its employees, Gene Hughes. A member of Metro’s human resources department asked plaintiff Vicky Crawford (a 30-year Metro employee) whether she had witnessed any of Hughes’ “inappropriate behavior.” Crawford, who was not the subject of the investigation and who had not previously complained of sexual harassment by Hughes, responded that Hughes had actually engaged in inappropriate behavior with her, which she described in detail. A few months after the investigation was completed, Crawford was terminated allegedly for embezzlement.

Crawford filed suit against Metro, alleging that Metro retaliated against her in violation of Title VII for her participation in the sexual harassment investigation. To state a prima facie claim for retaliation under Title VII, an employee must show that she either "opposed" a discriminatory employment practice or "participated" in a statutorily covered activity under Title VII. Metro moved for summary judgment arguing that Crawford could not sustain a claim for retaliation because she neither “opposed” a discriminatory employment practice (since she had never complained about Hughes’ conduct) nor had she “participated” in a statutorily covered activity under Title VII. Crawford argued that although she never reported Hughes’ conduct, her response to Metro’s human resources employee during the investigation constituted “protected activity” under Title VII’s prohibition against retaliation because she “opposed” the harassment by describing it in response to her employer’s questions.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee entered summary judgment in favor of Metro and the Six Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In finding for Crawford, the Supreme Court found that the primary objective of the anti-retaliation provision under Title VII is avoiding harm to employees. The Court held that for the purposes of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, an employee can “oppose” discrimination in the workplace by responding to an employer’s question about the discrimination at issue. The Court made clear that in order to "oppose" a discriminatory act, an employee need not engage in “active” or “consistent” resistance to it. In fact, Justice Souter who wrote for the majority, said that the required opposition would encompass “someone who has taken no action at all to advance a position beyond disclosing it.”

Justice Alito wrote a separate concurring opinion emphasizing his understanding that “the Court's holding does not and should not extend beyond employees who testify in internal investigations or engage in analogous purposive behavior.” Justice Alito stressed that the Court's holding should not extend Title VII protection to an employee's “silent opposition” to harassment or to mere conversations with a co-worker “at the proverbial water cooler” that may be subsequently relayed to the employer.
 

 WHAT IS EXPECTED FROM THE RULING?

It is anticipated that the Supreme Court’s holding in Crawford will now open the door for retaliation claims by investigation participants claiming they were “retaliated” against during or after an investigation. The lesson for employers is to treat all information it receives from employees (whether through a report/complaint, or in response to questions during an investigation) seriously and act upon it appropriately. Employees who participate in a workplace investigation should not suffer any adverse employment action because of such participation.

Supreme Court Places Greater Burden on Employers Defending Age Claims: Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory

In Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, an employer used a "matrix" method to carry out a reduction in force. The employer's method ranked its employees based on objective factors (i.e. performance and years of service) and subjective factors (i.e. flexibility and criticality). The employer then conducted a disparate impact analysis for the lowest scoring employees for several protected categories. However, no analysis was done for the employees' ages. 30 of the 31 workers laid off were over the age of 40.
28 of the laid off employees filed suit against the employer under the ADEA. The jury awarded the employees $6 million and the Second Circuit affirmed.
In an earlier case, Smith v. City of Jackson, the Supreme Court held that the ADEA permits "disparate impact" claims where an employment practice adversely harms older workers even without intent to do so. In Smith, the Court noted that the "reasonable factors other than age" provision in the ADEA was an important safeguard against employer liability, but it did not decide who had the burden of persuasion on that issue.
The Supreme Court agreed to decide one simple question in the Meacham case: does the employee or the employer have the burden of persuasion regarding the "reasonable factors other than age" issue? The Supreme Court held that the employee must establish the disparate impact, and the employer must prove that any disparate impact was based on reasonable factors other than age.
 

Supreme Court Issues "Opinion" on "Me Too" Evidence...Sort Of: Sprint v. Mendelsohn

In Sprint v. Mendelsohn, the U.S. Supreme Court held that admission of "me too" evidence in discrimination cases is fact based and "depends on many factors...." Plaintiff, who was 51 years old and the oldest employee in her department, was laid off during a company-wide reduction in force. She subsequently sued Sprint for disparate treatment based on her age under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).
The district court excluded evidence from former employees over the age of 40 who were also terminated in the same RIF (the "me too" evidence) because they did not work in plaintiff's group and they did not work for any of the same supervisors. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling as to the "me too" testimony and remanded the case for a new trial.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of the admissibility of "me too" evidence. The Court held that whether evidence of discrimination by other supervisors is relevant in an individual ADEA case "is fact based and depends on many factors, including how closely related the evidence is to the plaintiff's circumstances and theory of the case." They then remanded the case back down to the district court.
 

...And Now A Report On "Reverse" Discrimination: Hicks v. KNTV Television, Inc.

In Hicks v. KNTV Television, Inc., plaintiff, a white male, worked as a news anchor for defendant-employer. Plaintiff's contract was not renewed when it expired. Instead, defendant hired a black male to replace plaintiff. Plaintiff filed suit for discrimination, alleging that the employer did not renew his contract because it was being pressured to hire a minority. The employer argued that it did not discriminate against plaintiff and that plaintiff's contract was not renewed because his on air personality was too "aloof, distant, standoffish, unapproachable and anchor-like." The trial court found for the employer and plaintiff appealed.
On appeal, plaintiff argued that he was more objectively qualified for the job than his replacement. Plaintiff had more journalism experience, had more experience as an anchor, and had more practical experience in the market. The Court of Appeal, however, rejected these arguments. The Court focused on whether the employer's proffered reason for not renewing plaintiff's contract was pretextual. In its analysis, the Hicks court stated that subjective criteria have become more "critical" to making employment decisions; commenting that subjective characteristics like "common sense, good judgment, originality, loyalty, and tact," are "essential to an individual's success in a supervisory or professional position."
 

Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc. (U.S. Supreme Court)

Two African-American employees were denied promotions in the defendant's food processing plant that were ultimately awarded to two Caucasians. Among the proof of discrimination they offered was the fact that their supervisor used the term "boy" in referring to them. The Court of Appeals held that this term was insufficient to show racial bias.

Held: The Court of Appeals erred in laying down a per se rule that the term "boy" cannot constitute evidence of racial bias. Instead, that term first would have to be understood in the context in which it was used, including its historical usage, its usage in the workplace, the familiarity between the parties, etc. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit nevertheless reached the same result as before, finding that the plaintiffs' evidence of discriminatory intent remained insufficient as a matter of law.